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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plmntiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ERSELL HARRIS, 
Defendant-AppeUant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12998 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence 
entered against the appellant in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, in and for Salt Lake County, convicting him 
of Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried to a jury and convicted of the 
crone of Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card on November 
30. 1970. On January 5, 1971, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson 
committed appellant to the Utah State Prison for an in-
determinate term as provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court and a re-
marid for a new trial, or in the alternative resenttncing 
of <.ippcllant on the lesser included misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Trial in the above-entitled matter was held on No-
vember 22, 1970. The State's witnE:ss Robert Rose testi-
fiE'd that he was owner and operat01 of the Image (T. 
1U2) and that on January 21, 1970, the defendant entered 
hi~ shop (T. 104) in the company of Evelyn Davis (T. 
104). Mr. Rose testified that Evelyn Davis used the 
credit ca.rd at that time in the women's part of his shop 
(T. 108), she then asked the defendant if there was any-
thing he wanted (T. 108) and the defendant replied that 
hp liked a suit in the window (T. }08). Mr. Rose testi-
fied that Evelyn Davis told the defendant to try it on 
(T. 109), that the suit fit (T. 109) and that Evelyn Davis 
s::tid "We will take it" (T. 109). Mr. Rose testified that 
he then asked both of them how they were going to han-
dle> it (T. 110) and Evelyn Davis replied that the pur-
cha"C' would be on a credit ca.rd (T. 110). 
The witness testified that Evelyn Davis handed him 
the credit card (T. 111) and upon request showed him 
additional forms of identification (T. 111). During this 
time the defendant was standing at Evelyn Davis' side 
(T. 111). Mr. Rose prepared a draft marked exhibit 2 
(T. 112) and Evelyn Davis signed it with the name Lewis 
Flowers (T. 117). Mr. Rose depo~ited the Bankameri-
card draft signed by Evelyn Davis on January 26, 1970 
(T. 120, 121). The amount of tha purchase induding 
sale' tax was $146.30 (T. 118). Mr. Rose testified that 
thr value of the suit was $140.0U retail and between 
$70.00 and $75.00 at cost (T. 120). 
Mr. Rose testified that his stme had had dealings 
with Evelyn Davis prior to the date of the offense (T. 
127). 
The State witness, Christine Richards testified that 
on a date prior to the date of the offense (T. 132) she 
had been in the employ of the Image (T. 132) and sold 
a black woman a pants suit (T. 133) which had been 
cJ:iarged upon the Bankamericard :dentified as Plaintiff's 
E¥hibit 1 (T. 133). 
The State's witness, Mr. Allen J. Hunsaker, testified 
t'111t he was an assistant manager in the central opera-
tirins department for First Security Bank (T. 140). He 
further testified that the Image made a deposit of 
$272.94 on January 26 (T. 141) which included the 
$146.30 draft in the name "Flowers" (T. 144). The bank 
nctified Mrs. Flowers through the mails of the $146.30 
charge (T. 151) and that in this case he did not know 
whether or not she had paid it (T. 151). The witness 
testified that in the event Mrs. Flowers did not pay the 
charge they would charge it back to the Image (T. 151, 
lW), but that in this instance he did not know if this 
had been done or not (T. 151) . 
Mrs. Louise Flowers testified for the State that Ex-
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hibit 1 had been her credit card (T. 154), that she had 
lost her purse with her card in it (T. 153) and that she 
had not given anyone else permission to use the card (T. 
151). 
Mr. William Denning testified that on January 26 
he was working at Mode-0-Day (T. 157), and that 
Evelyn Davis again used the credit card marked Exhibit 
1 (T. 158) and that at that time she was accompanied 
by the defendant (T. 159). 
The defendant took the stand and testified that on 
JBnuary 21 he took Evelyn Davis downtown (T. 170) 
and she bought him a suit at the Image (T. 173). 
Counsel stipulated to take their exceptions to the 
instructions while the jury was deliberating (T. 204). 
The defendant's counsel took exception to instmction 
5A (T. 206). 
Defendant's counsel pointed out that the informa-
ticn charged the defendant with obtaining "goods r.aving 
a value in excess of $100.00" (T. 206). Defendant's 
counsel further pointed out that the information charged 
the defendant with obtaining "goods having a value in 
excess of $100.00" (T. 206). Defendant's counsel iurther 
pointed out that the statute, §76-20-8.1, Utah Code Anno-
t8t.ed, (1953) requires "value or cost" in excess of $100.00 
(T. 206). Defendant's counsel further complained that 
"by putting in the word 'retail' in paragraph five, the 
jury is left without the opportunity t.o make a determina· 
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tio'.1 on the evidence as to the value of the item in ques-
tion" (T. 206). 
Defendant's counsel further pointed out that the 
evidence was that "the cost to the merchant was $70.00" 
(T 206). The defendant's counsel further stated that 
"the question of value is crucial in this instance whereby 
$100.00 is the line of demarcation between a misdemeanor 
penc.lty and a felony penalty where the value of the 
goorl~ could be found to be under $100.00" (T. 207) . 
Defendant's counsel called the court's attention to 
its requested instruction 5A (T-pagc between 31 and 32) 
which used solely value as charged in the information and 
as made unlawful in the statute (T. 207). Defendant's 
proposed instruction 5A further allowed the jury the 
opportunity of finding the defendant guilty of the lesser 
included misdemeanor which the State's instruction did 
not allow (T. 23) (T-page between 21 and 32). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE 
COURT USED RETAIL VALUE RATHER 
THAN SIMPLY VALUE AS CONTAINED 
IN THE INFORMATION, THE STATUTE 
AND THE DEFENSE'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION. FURTHER THE JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT DID 
NOT INCLUDE AN INSTRUCTION ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED FRAUDULENT USE 
AS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENSE AND 
INCLUDED IN THEIR PROPOSED lN-
STRUCTION 5A. THE COURT BY THE IN-
STRUCTIONS THEY GAVE ELIMINATED 
FROM THE JURY THE POSSIBILITY OF 
THEIR FINDING THE DE FE ND AN 'r 
GUILTY OF THE LESSER INCLUDED 
FRAUDULENT USE PREJUDICING THE 
DEFENDANT'S POSITION TO SUCH AN 
EXTENT THAT THE TRIAL RESULTS 
MUST BE CORRECTED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
In State v. Pappacostas, 407 P. 2d 576, 17 Utah 2d 
197 (1965) the Supreme Court of the State of Utah stated 
"the determination of the facts should be scrupulously 
left to the jury." 
In Morris v. State, 491 P. 2d 784 (1971) the Okla-
homa Supreme Court stated, "in a larceny prosecution 
the value of the property stolen must be proven as a fact 
and it is to be determined by the jury." 
In People v. Lyarraga, 264 P. 2d 953, 122 C. A. 2d 
436 (1954) and State v. Melrose, 470 P. 2d 552, 2 Wash. 
App. 824 (1970) Washington and California also found 
value determination as to petit or grand theft a question 
for the jury. 
In State v. Sorrell, 388 P. 2d 429, 95 Ariz. 220 (1964), 
the court considered a case similar to the case at bar. In 
that case testimony had been given as to both retail and 
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wholesale value. The Arizona Court held that such prices 
fix the range within which the jury may find fair market 
value. 
In California the code covering theft, West's Anno-
tated Penal Code, §484, provides: "In determining the 
value of the property obtained for the purposes of this 
sEction, the reasonable and fair market value shall be 
thr test." In People v. Renfro, 38 Cal. Rptr. 832, 250 
C. A. 2d 921 (1967) the court four;.d replacement cost 
to be the fair market value. The newly revised Utah 
P2w~1 Code, §76-6-101 ( 4), Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
seems to deiline value as the lesser of market value or 
co:;t of replacement. In using such a definition the offense 
in the case at bar would be a misdemeanor bas~d upon 
the victim's statement that his wholesale cost on the item 
taken was $70.00. 
In State v. Close, 499 P. 2d 287, 28 Utah 2d 144 
( 1972) our Supreme Court considered the question of the 
court's instruction on lesser included offenses. The Court 
stated, "The well established general rule, that the jury 
should be instructed on lesser included offenses when 
such a conviction would be warranted by any reasonable 
view of the evidence, is in accord with and supported by 
our statutory law. §77-33-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
provides that 'The jury may find the defendant guilty of 
any offense the commission of which is necessarily in-
cluded in that with which he is charged in the indictment 
or information, or of an attempt to commit the offense.' " 
The Court listed ample Utah law on the question and 
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then went on to find that the court must instruct on the 
lesser included offense even in the absence of objection. 
In the case at bar there was a request for such an instruc-
tion. 
Earlier in State v. Gilli.am, 463 P. 2d 811, 23 Utah 
2d 372 ( 1970) our Supreme Court overruled a first de-
gree murder conviction where instructions for lesser in-
cluded offenses had not been given, finding that the de-
fendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on lesser 
included offenses "if any reasonable view of the evidence 
would support such a verdict." 
California held likewise in People v. Dewberry, 334 
P. 2d 852, 51 C. 2d 548 (1959). The California Supreme 
Court Justice Traynor writing the opinion held "That 
when the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of 
guilt of both the offense charged and a lesser included 
offense, the jury must be instructed that if they enter-
tain a reasonable doubt as to which offense has been 
committed, they must find the defendant guilty only of 
the lesser offense." Idaho held likewise in Cassey v. State, 
429 P. 2d 836, 91 Idaho 706 (1967). 
California's West Annotated Penal Code §1097 states 
"When reasonable doubt as to degree he can be convicted 
only of the lowest: When it appears that the defendant 
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable 
ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees he is 
guilty, he can be convicted of the lower of such degree 
only." Idaho has a similar statute, Idaho Code, §19-2105. 
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In State v. Fair, 456 P. 2d 168, 23 Utah 2d 34 (1966) 
and State v. Tapp, 490 P. 2d 334, 26 Utah 2d 392 (1971) 
our Supreme Court resolved questions as to applicable 
sentence in favor of the defendants, stating in Tapp 
"That in case of doubt or uncertainty as to the degree 
of the crime, the defendant in a criminal case is entitled 
to the lesser." The defendant in a criminal case in Utah 
is given every benefit of the doubt as to finding of guilt, 
degree of offense and sentence given upon conviction. 
In the case at bar the court, by refusing to give the de-
fendant's requested jury instruction 5A, did not avail the 
defendant of an opportunity to receive a benefit of doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly under the law the appellant in the case at 
bar was entitled at very least to 1) having the question 
of value submitted to the jury without being limited to 
"retail value" and 2) having the jury instructed as to the 
lesser included misdemeanor offense in the event the jury 
should find value to be less than $100.00. Since this was 
not done the appellant's conviction must be reversed or 
in the alternative the case must be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to resentence the appellant under 
the lesser included misdemeanor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK W. KUNKLER 
Attorney for Appellant 
